[mrtg] Re: virus alert iis / solaris

Garnel, Eric egarnel at Question.com
Tue May 8 16:50:43 MEST 2001

Check out the latest victims at http://www.attrition.org/

Eric Garnel
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Question Technologies
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egarnel at question.com

 -----Original Message-----
From: 	Rippe, Mark (CCI-Warwick) [mailto:Mark.Rippe at cox.com] 
Sent:	Tuesday, May 08, 2001 7:15 AM
To:	'bb at bb4.com'; 'mrtg at list.ee.ethz.ch'; 'ntop at unipi.it'
Subject:	[mrtg] virus alert iis / solaris


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mark.rippe at cox.com

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-----Original Message-----
From:	CERT Advisory [SMTP:cert-advisory at cert.org]
Sent:	Tuesday, May 08, 2001 1:05 AM
To:	cert-advisory at cert.org
Subject:	CERT Advisory CA-2001-11


CERT Advisory CA-2001-11 sadmind/IIS Worm

   Original release date: May 08, 2001
   Last revised: --
   Source: CERT/CC

   A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

     * Systems running unpatched versions of Microsoft IIS
     * Systems running unpatched versions of Solaris up to, and
       including, Solaris 7


   The CERT/CC has received reports of a new piece of self-propagating
   malicious code (referred to here as the sadmind/IIS worm). The worm
   uses two well-known vulnerabilities to compromise systems and deface
   web pages.

I. Description

   Based on preliminary analysis, the sadmind/IIS worm exploits a
   vulnerability in Solaris systems and subsequently installs software to
   attack Microsoft IIS web servers. In addition, it includes a component
   to propagate itself automatically to other vulnerable Solaris systems.
   It will add "+ +" to the .rhosts file in the root user's home
   directory. Finally, it will modify the index.html on the host Solaris
   system after compromising 2,000 IIS systems.

   To compromise the Solaris systems, the worm takes advantage of a
   two-year-old buffer overflow vulnerability in the Solstice sadmind
   program. For more information on this vulnerability, see


   After successfully compromising the Solaris systems, it uses a
   seven-month-old vulnerability to compromise the IIS systems. For
   additional information about this vulnerability, see


   Solaris systems that are successfully compromised via the worm exhibit
   the following characteristics:

Sample syslog entry from compromised Solaris system

May  7 02:40:01 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Bus Error
- c
ore dumped
May  7 02:40:01 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:40:03 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:40:06 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind:
Fault - core dumped
May  7 02:40:03 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:40:06 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind:
Fault - core dumped
May  7 02:40:08 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Hangup
May  7 02:40:08 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:44:14 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Killed
     * A rootshell listening on TCP port 600
     * Existence of the directories

     * /dev/cub contains logs of compromised machines
     * /dev/cuc contains tools that the worm uses to operate and

     Running processes of the scripts associated with the worm, such as
   the following:
     * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/sadmin.sh
     * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 111
     * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 80
     * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/uniattack.sh
     * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/time.sh
     * /usr/sbin/inetd -s /tmp/.f
     * /bin/sleep 300

   Microsoft IIS servers that are successfully compromised exhibit the
   following characteristics:

     * Modified web pages that read as follows:
                            fuck USA Government
                               fuck PoizonBOx
                       contact:sysadmcn at yahoo.com.cn
Sample Log from Attacked IIS Server

2001-05-06 12:20:19 - 80 \
           GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe /c+dir 200 -
2001-05-06 12:20:19 - 80 \
           GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe /c+dir+..\ 200 -
2001-05-06 12:20:19 - 80 \
           GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe \
           /c+copy+\winnt\system32\cmd.exe+root.exe 502 -
2001-05-06 12:20:19 - 80 \
           GET /scripts/root.exe /c+echo+\
           <HTML code inserted here>.././index.asp 502 -

II. Impact

   Solaris systems compromised by this worm are being used to scan and
   compromise other Solaris and IIS systems. IIS systems compromised by
   this worm can suffer modified web content.

   Intruders can use the vulnerabilities exploited by this worm to
   execute arbitrary code with root privileges on vulnerable Solaris
   systems, and arbitrary commands with the privileges of the
   IUSR_machinename account on vulnerable Windows systems.

   We are receiving reports of other activity, including one report of
   files being destroyed on the compromised Windows machine, rendering
   them unbootable. It is unclear at this time if this activity is
   directly related to this worm.

III. Solutions

Apply a patch from your vendor

   A patch is available from Microsoft at


          For IIS Version 4:

          For IIS Version 5:

   Additional advice on securing IIS web servers is available from


   Apply a patch from Sun Microsystems as described in Sun Security
   Bulletin #00191:


Appendix A. Vendor Information

Microsoft Corporation

   The following documents regarding this vulnerability are available
   from Microsoft:


Sun Microsystems

   Sun has issued the following bulletin for this vulnerability:



    1. Vulnerability Note VU#111677: Microsoft IIS 4.0 / 5.0 vulnerable
       to directory traversal via extended unicode in url (MS00-078)
    2. CERT Advisory CA-1999-16 Buffer Overflow in Sun Solstice
       AdminSuite Daemon sadmind

   Authors:  Chad Dougherty, Shawn Hernan, Jeff Havrilla, Jeff Carpenter,
   Art Manion, Ian Finlay, John Shaffer

   This document is available from:

CERT/CC Contact Information

   Email: cert at cert.org
          Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
          Fax: +1 412-268-6989
          Postal address:
          CERT Coordination Center
          Software Engineering Institute
          Carnegie Mellon University
          Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890

   CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
   Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other
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    Using encryption

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    Getting security information

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   To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
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   * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
   Patent and Trademark Office.

   Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
   Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
   Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
   implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
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   does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
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   Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information

   Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.

   Revision History
May 08, 2001: Initial Release

Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i for non-commercial use
Charset: noconv


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